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Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of 
indirect taxes, this paper shows that more intense competition may have the negative side-
effect of eroding tax revenues by increasing tax evasion. This will be the case if market entry 
costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is 
either weakly concave or convex and inelastic. The desirable result of more competition, less 
evasion and higher tax revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and 
demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases. 
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1. Introduction 
Competition  policy  is  an  important  component  of  economic  policy.  The  European 
Commission, for example, runs a branch concerned with antitrust and liberalisation, and also 
every member state of the European Union has its own national competition authority. Such 
institutions usually aim at reducing market power and intensifying the degree of competition 
among firms. For instance, the European Commission states that “[c]ompetition is a basic 
mechanism of the market economy and encourages companies to provide consumers products 
that  consumers  want.  It  encourages  innovation,  and  pushes  down  prices.  In  order  to  be 
effective, competition needs suppliers who are independent of each other, each subject to the 
competitive  pressure  exerted  by  the  others.”
1  Opening  markets  and  thereby  intensifying 
competition was also one of the goals of introducing a common market in Europe. The central 
point of this paper is that competition policies may have negative side effects undermining the 
positive effects of increasing competition. In our paper, these side effects are triggered by tax 
evasion. We show that reducing market power may induce firms to intensify tax evasion 
activities and, as a consequence, tax revenues may fall. 
These results are obtained using a Cournot oligopoly model with endogenous market entry. 
The number of firms is determined by a zero-profit condition, stating that expected profits 
equal market entry costs. Those firms entering the market produce a homogenous good at 
constant  marginal  costs.  The  good  is  sold  to  consumers  whose  demand  is  captured  by  a 
standard (inverse) demand function. Firms have to pay an ad valorem sales tax but may evade 
part of their tax duty.
2 If a firm is detected evading taxes, it will be penalised. The degree of 
tax evasion is measured either by the absolute amount of taxes evaded successfully or the tax 
evasion ratio. This ratio is defined as the amount of taxes evaded, relative to hypothetical tax 
revenues, i.e. tax revenues in the absence of evasion. We follow the industrial organization 
literature and measure the degree of market power by the Lerner-index which reflects the 
price-cost mark up, i.e. the difference between a firm’s (after-tax) output price and marginal 
production costs, expressed as a percentage of the (after-tax) output price (e.g. Martin, 2001). 
Within this model we analyze the effects of reductions in market entry costs and marginal 
production costs, as well as a greater price elasticity of commodity demand. Following Bliss 
                                                 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html. 
2 Our choice of a sales tax is motivated by two empirical observations. First, during the last decades revenues 
from indirect taxes have become increasingly important. For example, in OECD countries VAT revenues as 
percentage of total tax revenues increased from 11.9% in 1965 to 17.9% in 1998 (OECD, 2001). Second, it is by 
now  well  known  that,  despite  the  governments’  increasing  reliance  on  indirect  taxes,  a  substantial  part  of 
potential VAT revenues is lost through tax evasion (Keen and Smith 2006). Nevertheless, our basic results 
intuitively apply to other kinds of corporate taxes as well.   2 
and Di Tella (1997, p. 1002), who analyze the relation between corruption and competition 
when coining this term, we refer to "… deep competition (parameters), to distinguish them 
from  measures  of  competition,  such  as  the  number  of  firms,  that  are  defined  from  the 
equilibrium outcome". Restricting government policies to activities easing market entry or 
reducing – but not eliminating – the scope for setting prices, represents a plausible description 
of the policy space. This is because a government can hardly force firms to enter a market or 
to behave in a distinct manner in a market economy. Instead, competition policy can alter 
incentives by affecting the constraints under which firms optimise. Hence, changes in deep 
competition parameters can be interpreted to broadly reflect the above mentioned deregulation 
policies. Furthermore, such changes are triggered by globalization and economic integration 
like the European unification.  In previous decades, these developments have considerably 
reduced barriers to enter foreign markets (e.g. Djankov et al., 2002, Conway et al., 2005, 
Dreher, 2006). Marginal production costs have fallen due to improved outsourcing and off-
shoring opportunities as well as increased competition on input markets (e.g. Girma and Görg, 
2004).  In  addition,  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  has  increased  because  of  more 
comprehensive cross-border shopping activities and greater market transparency, for example, 
due to the internet. 
Our analysis shows that a reduction in market entry costs intensifies competition by reducing 
the Lerner-index. At the same time, however, absolute tax evasion and the tax evasion ratio 
increase so that tax revenues may decline. Intuitively, the reason for this is that lower barriers 
to entry increase the number of firms and thereby reduce turnover per firm, as output per firm 
and the market price decline. Firms therefore use tax evasion as a substitute for the loss in 
market power. With respect to reductions in marginal production costs, results are less clear-
cut, but we are still able to identify cases in which tax evasion rises and tax revenues decline. 
This will be the case if demand is linear or concave, since turnover per firm again drops (even 
though, in contrast to a fall in entry costs, lower marginal production costs ceteris paribus 
provide the  firms with  an incentive to raise output). Under  (strictly) convex demand, the 
effects of decreasing marginal costs depend on the price elasticity of demand. For elastic 
demand, the decline in the equilibrium price is moderate and the incentives to raise output are 
sufficiently strong to increase turnover per firm. Hence, firms evade relatively less taxes and 
tax revenues rise. As this argument is reversed for an inelastic demand function, however, we 
have  a  further  case  with  rising  tax  evasion  and  decreasing  tax  revenues.  Interestingly,  a 
reduction in marginal production costs can not only erode tax revenues, but may also fail to 
improve the degree of competition among firms. The Lerner-index may increase since there is   3 
now a direct positive effect of the lower marginal costs on the Lerner-index which may over-
compensate the decline in the market price. We finally show that an increase in the demand 
elasticity seems to be the best way to intensify competition, as it not only makes the negative 
effects of a decline in marginal production costs less likely, but by itself reduces the Lerner-
index and enhances tax revenues due to a decline in the tax evasion ratio.  
While there is huge number of articles on tax evasion by individuals, less attention has been 
paid to the analysis of tax evasion by firms
3 and only one study has looked at the relationship 
between tax evasion and competition. Previous authors have investigated the incentives of tax 
evading firms under different market structures. Virmani (1989), Cremer and Gahvari (1992, 
1993, 1999), Yaniv (1995) and Panteghini (2000) consider perfectly competitive firms, while 
Marrelli (1984), Kreutzer and Lee (1986, 1988), Wang and Conant (1988), Wang (1990), 
Yaniv (1995, 1996) and Lee (1998) focus on a monopoly. Oligopoly settings are investigated 
in Bayer and Cowell (2006) and Goerke and Runkel (2006). The former article analyzes the 
role of the audit rule, while the latter shows that output and evasion decisions will not be 
independent if the number of firms is endogenous. To the best of our knowledge, the only 
article on the relation between competition and tax evasion is the one by Marelli and Martina 
(1988). They conclude that tax evasion is the smaller, the more competitive the market is, 
given a symmetric duopoly or a setting with asymmetric costs, provided the costs differential 
is not too large. Hence, the result of Marelli and Martina (1988) contrasts with our finding 
that a higher degree of competition may raise tax evasion. There are mainly two reasons for 
the difference: First, Marelli and Martina (1988) focus on a conjectural variation parameter to 
model a change in competition, while we look at the impact of deep competition parameters. 
Second,  Marelli  and  Martina  (1988)  assume  decreasing  absolute  risk  aversion.  The  less 
collusive  the  market,  the  smaller  the  profits  are  and  the  higher  the  risk  aversion  is.  This 
provides firms with the incentive to evade less when competition becomes more intensive. To 
rule out such risk driven tax evasion, we suppose risk neutral firms.
4 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the market 
equilibrium. In Section 3 we determine the impact of the deep competition parameters on the 
market equilibrium. Section 4 summarises. 
 
                                                 
3 The surveys by Alm (1999), Andreoni et al. (1998), Franzoni (2000a) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), focus 
on tax evasion by individuals. Recently the attention has shifted somewhat, since the reviews by Cowell (2004), 
Sandmo (2005), and Slemrod (2007) contain separate, but often short sections on tax evasion by firms. 
4 It is straightforward to show that under constant absolute risk aversion the degree of competition does not have 
an effect on tax evasion in the Marelli and Martina (1988) framework.   4 
2. Model 
We consider a two stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter the market, 
comparing expected net profits with constant market entry costs. In the second stage, given 
the entry decision and thereby the number of firms, competition in quantities takes place. In 
this  stage,  firms  have  to  pay  an  ad  valorem  sales  tax,  but  may  evade  a  part  of  their  tax 
obligations. To ensure a subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the model recursively. 
Suppose n ≥  1 firms have entered the market in the first stage. Firm i = 1,…,n produces xi 
units  of  a  homogenous  consumption  good  at  constant  marginal  costs  c > 0.  The  quantity 
supplied by firm i's rivals is denoted by Xi = ∑ ¹
n
i j j x , and X = xi + Xi represents aggregate 
output  of  all  firms.  The  (inverse)  demand  function  P(X)  satisfies  P'(X) < 0  and 
P'(X) + xiP''(X) < 0.  The  latter  condition  states  that  the  firms’  output  levels  are  strategic 
substitutes  as  defined  by  Bulow  et  al.  (1985).  In  the  standard  Cournot  oligopoly  model 
without tax evasion, the assumption of strategic substitutes ensures that the firms' reaction 
curves  are  downward  sloping  and  that  the  necessary  conditions  for  stability  are  satisfied 
(Dixit, 1986). The implications in our model with tax evasion are the same since we will show 
below that, for a given number of firms, output decisions are independent of tax evasion. 
The tax rate of the sales tax is denoted by τ œ ]0,1[. The true tax base of firm i reads xiP(X). 
Firms  may  understate  their  turnover  in  order  to  evade  taxes.  Thus,  firm  i  declares 
αi œ [0, xiP(X)] as tax base to the tax authority. Accordingly, evaded revenues of firm i are 
given by xiP(X) - αi. With probability 1 - q œ ]0, 1] tax evasion remains undetected and firm 
i’s tax bill amounts to ταi. In case of detection, taking place with probability q, firm i has to 
pay taxes on full revenues, xiP(X), and, in addition, a penalty F[xiP(X) - αi], as we do not 
consider amnesties or settlements (see, for example, Franzoni 2000b and Macho-Stadler and 
Pérez-Castrillo  2004).  The  penalty  is  increasing  and  strictly  convex  in  evaded  revenues 
xiP(X) - αi,  i.e.  F'[•], F''[•] > 0.
5  Moreover,  we  assume  F(0) = 0,  so  honest  firms  go 
unpunished.  As  firms  are  risk  neutral,  the  expected  penalty  q F[xiP(X) - αi]  can, 
alternatively, be interpreted as a cost of evasion function (see Virmani 1989 and Cremer and 
Gahvari 1992, 1993 for such an interpretation). 
                                                 
5 Our subsequent results would qualitatively also hold, if the penalty is assumed to be a function of taxes evaded.   5 
Firm i's expected profits in the second stage read 
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The first bracketed term in equation (1) equals firm i's profits in case tax evasion is detected, 
while  the  second  term  represents  profits  if  such  activities  remain  undetected.  Firm  i 
maximizes Πi, simultaneously choosing output xi and declared revenues αi, taking as given 
the output of all other firms j ≠ i. We focus on an interior solution for the tax evasion problem 
throughout.
6 The first-order conditions can be written as 
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The second-order conditions are satisfied since F'' > 0 and P' + xiP'' < 0 imply 
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Therefore, the first-order conditions (2) and (3) determine firm i’s profit-maximizing choices 
of declared revenue, αi*, and output, xi*. 
The solution to equations (2) and (3) for i = 1,…,n represents the Nash equilibrium in the 
second stage of our oligopoly model. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium is 
symmetric,  i.e.  xi* = x*,  αi* = α*  and  X* = xi* + Xi* = nx*  for  all  i = 1,…,n.
7  Using  the 
symmetry property in equations (2) and (3) yields  
0 *] *) nx ( P * x [ ' qF ) q 1 ( : A = a - + t - - = ,        (5) 
0 c *)] nx ( ' P * x *) nx ( P )[ 1 ( : B = - + t - = .        (6) 
                                                 
6 An interior solution αi ∈ ]0, xiP(X)[ will be warranted, if 0 < (1 - q)τ < qF'[xiP(X)]. Models of indirect tax 
evasion which investigate the determinants of complete evasion or honesty are looked at by Virmani (1989) or 
Cremer and Gahvari (1992), for example. 
7 Suppose the opposite is true, i.e. there are at least two firms j and k with xj* ≠ xk*. From (2) and (3) we can 
then derive (1 - τ)(xj* - xk*) P' = 0 which contradicts xj* ≠ xk*. Thus, xi* = x* for all i = 1,…,n. Equation (2) 
then implies αi* = α* for all i = 1,…,n.   6 
These equations have the usual interpretation. According to (5), each firm declares an amount 
of revenues in equilibrium so that the expected marginal tax savings from evasion equal the 
expected marginal penalty, while (6) states that the equilibrium output of each firm equates 
after-tax  marginal  revenues  and  marginal  costs.  Equation  (6)  also  shows  that  for  a  given 
number of firms the standard independence result holds, according to which a firm's output 
choice  is  unaffected  by  its  evasion  activities  (e.g.  Yaniv,  1995).  As  we  will  see  below, 
however, evasion alters the incentives to enter the market. Accordingly, the output decision is 
no longer independent from tax evasion activities. This result, established by Goerke and 
Runkel (2006), also holds in the present setting. Moreover, equation (5) indicates that the 
absolute amount of revenues evaded per firm, x*P(n*x*) – α*, is affected neither by marginal 
production costs, nor by market entry costs or the price elasticity of demand, which we will 
formally introduce below. This is plausible as marginal tax savings from evasion activities are 
solely determined by the tax rate and the detection probability. Hence, we can treat taxes 
evaded per firm as a constant. It has to be emphasised, though, that this property does not 
prevent a relation between evasion and competition. Changes in the degree of competition are 
usually accompanied by variations in the number of firms and, thus, aggregate tax evasion. 
Moreover, the importance of tax evasion may better be measured in relation to the size of the 
market which, of course, is also related to the degree of competition. 
Equations (5) and (6) jointly determine x* and α* as functions of the model parameters and 
the number of firms n. Inserting these functions into equation (1) defines the equilibrium level 
of expected profits Π* of a single firm in stage 2. If we differentiate Π* with respect to n and 
take into account (5), (6), and dx*/dn determined by (6), we will obtain 
0
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,        (7) 
where the sign follows from P' < 0 and P' + x*P'' < 0. Equation (7) implies that equilibrium 
expected profits Π* in stage 2 decline with the number of firms entering the market in stage 1. 
Having characterized the equilibrium in the second stage, we now turn to the first stage in 
which  firms  decide  whether  to  enter  the  market.  In  doing  so,  they  take  into  account  the 
properties of the equilibrium in the second stage. If a firm enters, it will incur market entry 
costs Γ ≥ 0. These costs are the same for all potential entrants. Since Π* declines in the 
number of firms, entry continues until equilibrium expected second stage profits Π* equal 
market entry costs Γ or, equivalently, until   7 
0 *] ) * x * n ( P * x [ ) q 1 ( *] ) * x * n ( P * x [ qF * cx *) x * n ( P * x ) 1 ( : Z = G - a - t - + a - - - t - = ,  (8) 
where n* denotes the equilibrium number of  firms entering the market in the  first stage. 
Strictly  speaking,  n*  is  an  integer  variable.  For  the  sake  of  tractability,  and  as  usual  in 
oligopoly models with an endogenous number of firms (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas 1995), 
we treat n* as a continuous variable that approximates the true integer value. 
The overall equilibrium of our two stage model is characterized by equations (5), (6) and (8), 
which determine the equilibrium number of firms, n*, equilibrium output, x*, and equilibrium 
declared  revenues,  α*,  as  functions  of  the  model  parameters.  Of  special  interest  in  the 
subsequent analysis are the parameters which, in the introduction, we referred to as deep 
competition parameters, i.e. market entry costs, Γ, marginal production costs, c, and the price 
elasticity of demand (which we shall introduce formally below). The focus of our analysis in 
the next section will be on the question of how these parameters influence the degree of 
competition, tax evasion and tax revenues in the market equilibrium of the industry. 
The degree of competition is inversely related to the firms’ market power which, in turn, can 
be measured by the Lerner-index, i.e. the difference between the (after-tax) output price and 
marginal production costs, relative to the (after-tax) output price. The Lerner-index reads 
x*) * )P(n (1




= .            (9) 
Note that in computing the Lerner-index we ignore tax evasion activities. The reason is that 
the  equilibrium  second  stage  profits  of  a  single  firm  can  be  written  as  Π* = (1 – τ)x*P –
 cx* + k where k := qF(x*P – α*) – (1 – q)τ[x*P – α*] is independent of the deep competition 
parameters (remember that x*P – α* does not depend on the deep competition parameters 
according to equation (5)). Hence, a firm’s equilibrium profits in the presence of tax evasion 
equal the firm’s equilibrium profits without tax evasion plus a constant term. It is therefore 
suitable to use the same indicator of market power as in a case where no tax evasion occurs. 
We finally need to specify tax revenues and the measures of tax evasion. Dividing absolute 
revenues  evaded  per  firm,  x*P(x*n*) – α*,  by  the  actual  turnover,  x*P(x*n*),  we  obtain 
relative  revenues  evaded  per  firm.  Absolute  and  relative  tax  evasion  per  firm  is  used  as 
indicator of tax evasion by  Marelli and Martina (1988), Virmani (1989) and Cremer and 
Gahvari (1992, 1993, 1999), for example. Marelli (1984) points out that in a setting with 
several firms, total evasion in the entire market may be of interest. We therefore introduce the 
absolute amount of taxes evaded successfully as   8 
H := (1 – q)τn*[x*P(n*x*) – α*].          (10) 
As an alternative measure we will investigate relative aggregate tax evasion. Let hypothetical 
tax revenues, i.e. the amount of tax revenues which would arise without evasion, be given by 
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which represents the fraction of aggregate tax revenues evaded successfully. The advantage of 
the tax evasion ratio T as an indicator of evasion behaviour is that it describes tax evasion 
relative to the size of the market. It therefore also captures changes in the firms' activities due 
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Tax revenues R equal the difference between hypothetical (or maximal) tax revenues and the 
absolute amount of taxes evaded successfully by the firms. 
 
3. Variations in Deep Competition Parameters 
The effects of a change in a parameter θ on the endogenous variables can be obtained by 
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From (8) we obtain Zn = (1 – τ)x*2P' < 0, Zα = 0, Zx = (n* – 1)(1 – τ)x*P' ≤  0, where use has 
been made of equations (5) and (6). Equation (5) yields An = qx*2F''P' < 0, Aα = – qF'' < 0 
and Ax = q(P + n*x*P')F''. Finally, Bn = (1 – τ)x*(P' + x*P''), Bα = 0, Bx = (1 – τ)[(n* + 1)P' + 
 n*x*P''] < 0 is obtained by differentiating (6). The determinant of the matrix on the LHS of 
(13)  is  D
~
 := – qx*2(1 – τ)2(2P' + x*P'')P'F'' < 0.  For  notational  convenience,  we  define  
  := – D
~
/q(1 – τ)F'' > 0.  
Let us first investigate the impact of a fall in market entry costs, Γ. These costs comprise, for 
example, initial investment costs, licence fees, or the monetary and time costs of fulfilling 
government regulations (Djankov et al. 2002, Conway et al. 2005). A decline in Γ may be due   9 
to deregulation policies, for example. In many countries, competition authorities have opened 
markets of key industries like the transport or telecommunication sector by lowering the legal 
and economic requirements potential producers have to fulfil when entering the market. Other 
reasons for declining entry costs are globalization and economic integration which reduce 
trade  and  entry  barriers  or  grant  access  to  new  information  technologies  like  the  internet 
making it easier for firms to enter markets.
8 Formally, from equations (5), (6) and (8) we have 
AΓ = BΓ = 0 and ZΓ = – 1. Setting θ = Γ in equation (13) then implies 
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where we used the fact that x*P(n*x*) – α* is constant in (15). From (14) and (16) follows 
0
' P * x
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Equation (14) shows that lower entry costs raise the equilibrium number of firms, n*, since 
more firms find it profitable to enter the market. According to (16), the increase in the number 
of firms reduces output per firm, x*. The reason is that output levels of the firms are strategic 
substitutes. Nevertheless, the additional output of the new firms entering the market more than 
outweighs  the  decline  in  the  incumbents’  production.  Aggregate  output,  n*x*,  grows  as 
shown by equation (17). As consequence, the market price, P, and turnover per firm, x*P, as 
well as declared revenues, α*, shrink according to equation (15). 
Having determined the effects of entry costs on market outcomes, it is straightforward to 
specify the impact of a decline in Γ on competition and tax evasion. The fall in the output 
price, P, is equivalent to a drop in the Lerner-index, L, as marginal production costs, c, are 
unaffected. From equation (5) we know that absolute evasion per firm, x*P(n*x*) – α*, is 
constant. Since the number of firms, n*, increases as Γ declines, absolute tax evasion, H, has 
to rise. Moreover, (15)  indicates that turnover per firm, x*P(n*x*), falls. This implies an 
increase in the tax evasion ratio, T. Finally, since H and T move into the same direction, the 
                                                 
8 While governments or competition agencies can alter market entry costs, they will never be able to abolish 
them completely as such costs also include components arising in the absence of government intervention.   10 
effect of a change in market entry costs, Γ, on tax revenues, R, is uncertain. These findings are 
summarized in  
Proposition 1: A reduction in market entry costs, Γ, reduces the Lerner-index, L, but raises 
absolute  tax  evasion,  H,  and  the  tax  evasion  ratio,  T.  The  effect  on  tax  revenues,  R,  is 
ambiguous. 
Proposition 1 reveals a basic trade-off between competition and tax evasion: If firms are more 
constrained in their pricing behaviour because their number has risen and the price-cost mark-
up has fallen, owing to a reduction in market entry costs, they will select an alternative means 
of raising profits. In our model, this alternative avenue is constituted by tax evasion. Hence, 
there is an inverse relation between the intensity of competition and the degree of tax evasion. 
The model therefore provides a formalisation of Shleifer's (2004) claim that competition may 
decrease ethical (i. e. legal) behaviour. Intuitively, the decline in market entry costs increases 
the number of firms and so reduces the market power of each firm. Both output per firm and 
the market price fall. The consequence is that turnover per firm goes down. Each firm evades 
a larger share of its turnover. Firms therefore use tax evasion as a substitute for the loss in 
market power. Proposition 1 also shows that the reduction in market entry costs may decrease 
tax revenues. This will unambiguously be the case if P(X) + x*n*P'(X) < 0 holds.
9 In such a 
situation, the positive effect of increasing the degree of competition is not only accompanied 
by the negative effect of increasing tax evasion, but also by a decline in public funds. 
While the relationship between tax evasion and competition caused by a variation in market 
entry costs is unambiguous, the effects of a change in marginal production costs, c, are more 
uncertain.  Governments  can  affect  this  deep  competition  parameter  by  liberalising  input 
markets, slashing the bureaucratic burden imposed on firms or simplifying international trade 
in inputs. The derivatives of (5), (6), and (8) with respect to the deep competition parameter c 
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9 An example is the case of an isoelastic demand function P(X) = X
 –1/h which we will use frequently in the 
subsequent analysis. For this demand function it straightforward to show that a decline in Γ will exert a negative 
effect on R if h ≤ 1. In case of h > 1, the effect of Γ on R is ambiguous.   11 
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Equations (18) and (20) yield 
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Equation (21) shows that a decline in marginal costs, c, increases aggregate output and, thus, 
lowers the equilibrium price P. In contrast to variations in market entry costs, however, the 
signs of all other effects are ambiguous. The reason is that a change in marginal production 
costs does not only have a first-order effect on the number of firms via equation (8), but by 
equation (6) also on the output per firm: Reducing c relaxes the zero profit condition (8), so 
the number of firms increases ceteris paribus and output per firm declines according to the 
assumption  of  strategic  substitutes.  But  by  the  marginal  condition  (6)  lower  marginal 
production costs ceteris paribus induce each firm to raise output. As a consequence there is a 
negative impact on the number of firms. Overall, we obtain two countervailing effects on the 
number of firms, the output per firm and, thus, turnover per firm. As shown by (18) – (20) the 
sign of the sum of both effects depends on the curvature of the demand function. 
To reduce the ambiguity captured by equations (18) – (20), let us first take a closer look at the 
case of a concave or linear demand function. Taking into account P'' < 0 in (18) – (20) implies 
that the decline in marginal production costs increases the number of firms and reduces output 
and turnover per firm. Intuitively, for P'' < 0 marginal revenues P(n*x*) + x*P'(n*x*) react 
quite sensitively to variations in output per firm (keeping constant the number of firms). As a 
consequence, the positive effect of a reduction in marginal costs, c, on output via the marginal 
condition (6) is small and the already known negative impact of a fall in c on output per firm 
via the zero profit condition (8) dominates. Output and turnover per firm therefore fall while 
the number of firms increases. Almost the same is true for P'' = 0 except for the fact that under 
a linear demand function output per firm is constant. This is the case because the new positive 
effect via equation (6) exactly compensates the negative effect via equation (8). 
With the help of this information we can now turn to the effects of a reduction in c on tax 
evasion and competition under a weakly concave demand function (P'' ≤ 0). Since a decline in 
marginal costs, c, raises the number of firms, n*, and leaves unaltered revenues evaded per 
firm, x*P(n*x*) – α*, absolute tax evasion, H, rises. The same is true for the tax evasion ratio, 
T,  as  the  turnover  per  firm,  x*P(n*x*),  declines.  Because  H  and  T  move  into  the  same   12 
direction, the effect on tax revenues, R, is ambiguous. The impact on the Lerner index, L, can 
be written as 
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For P'' ≤ 0 this expression is unambiguously negative, implying that a decline in marginal 
production costs, c, raises the Lerner-index, L. These insights are summarized in  
Proposition 2: Suppose the inverse demand function is weakly concave, i.e. P'' ≤  0. Then, a 
reduction in marginal production costs, c, raises the Lerner-index, L, as well as absolute tax 
evasion, H, and the tax evasion ratio, T. The impact on tax revenues, R, is ambiguous. 
Under a weakly concave demand function, a decline in marginal production costs increases 
tax evasion. Intuitively, lower marginal production costs imply a fall in the market price and 
output per firm (for P'' < 0). Turnover per firm therefore shrinks and each firm increases the 
share of revenues evaded. Despite the fact that absolute tax evasion per firm remains constant, 
total absolute tax evasion goes up since more firms enter the market. As a consequence, tax 
revenues may be lowered. This is the same line of reasoning as for variations in market entry 
costs, characterized by Proposition 1. However, Proposition 2 reveals an important difference 
between the two deep competition parameters. While a reduction in entry costs decreases 
market power of firms, a decline in marginal production costs exerts exactly the opposite 
effects on the degree of competition. The  reason is that, in contrast to variations in Γ,  a 
decline in c has a direct positive effect on the Lerner-index, L. For a weakly concave demand 
function this effect is stronger than the fall in the market price P so that the decline in c 
unambiguously increases L. Lower marginal production costs may therefore not only worsen 
the situation of public budgets but may even fail to ensure more intensive competition. 
How will the insights of Proposition 2 be changed if we consider a strictly convex demand 
function? From equation (19) we see for P'' > 0 that a decline in marginal costs, c, increases 
output per firm (because the positive effect via condition (6) is strong enough to outweigh the 
negative impact caused via the profit constraint (8)). But all other effects are indeterminate. In 
particular, due to the increase in output per firm and the decrease in the output price, P, it is 
no  longer  clear  how  a  fall  in  marginal  costs  will  affect  turnover  per  firm  and,  thus,  tax 
evasion. It may well be that turnover goes up so that tax evasion is reduced. In addition, 
equation (22) shows that the effect of a variation in c on market power, as measured by the 
Lerner-index, L, is ambiguous for a strictly convex demand function.   13 
Nevertheless, we can obtain clear-cut results if we focus on the isoelastic demand function 
P(X) = X
 –1/h, where h := – P(X)/[XP'(X)] > 0 is the price elasticity of demand. This function 
is  strictly  convex  as  P'(X) = – (1/h)X
 –(1+h)/h < 0  and  P''(X) = (1 + h)(1/h2)X
 –(1+2h)/h > 0.
10 
The  expressions  in  the  numerator  of  (18)  and  (20)  can  then  be  calculated  as 
2P' + n*x*P'' = (1 – h)(1/h2)X
 –(1+h)/h and PP'' – 2P'2 = – (1 – h)(1/h2)X
 –2(1+h)/h. Hence, the 
effects  of  a  change  in  marginal  productions  costs,  c,  depend  crucially  on  the  demand 
elasticity.  If  demand  is  elastic  (h > 1),  we  will  obtain  dn*/dc < 0  and 
dα*/dc = d[x*P(n*x*)]/dc < 0, i.e. a decline in marginal production costs raises the number of 
firms and turnover per firm. The reason is that, under an elastic demand, the increase in total 
output induces a moderate fall of the market price so that this effect is dominated by the 
growth in output per firm. If demand is inelastic (h < 1), we will obtain the opposite results, 
i.e.  dn*/dc > 0  and  dα*/dc = d[x*P(n*x*)]/dc > 0.  The  fall  in  the  market  price  is  now 
substantial and outweighs the increases in output so that turnover per firm declines. Marginal 
costs will not exert an effect on the number of firms and turnover per firm if h = 1. 
With this information we can again figure out the effects of c on tax evasion and competition. 
Since  for  h > 1  (h < 1)  the  number  of  firms,  n*,  rises  (falls)  in  response  to  a  decline  in 
marginal  costs,  c,  absolute  tax  evasion,  H,  rises  (falls)  as  well  (remember  that  revenues 
evaded per firm, x*P(n*x*) – α*, remain constant). In contrast, the tax evasion ratio, T, will 
decrease (increase) if demand is elastic (inelastic) because the turnover per firm, x*P(n*x*), 
will be raised (lowered) if h > 1 (h < 1). As H and T move into opposite directions, the effect 
on tax revenues, R, is now unambiguous, i.e. R increases (decreases) for h > 1 (h < 1). With 
respect to the Lerner-index, L (cf. equation (22)), we have to take into account that 2P'[(1 –
 τ)P – c] + x*(1 – τ)PP'' = –(1 – η)(1/η2)x*(1 – τ)X–2(1 + η)/η  since  (1 – τ)P – c = –(1 – τ)x*P' 
according to equation (6). Inserting this into (22) proves dL/dc > ( < ) 0 if and only if h > 1 
(h < 1). Hence, a decline in marginal production costs, c, will decrease (increase) the Lerner-
index, L, if demand is elastic (inelastic). These insights are summarized in  
Proposition  3:  Suppose  P(X) = X –1/h  with  h > 0.  If  h > 1,  a  reduction  in  marginal 
production costs, c, will decrease the Lerner-index, L, and the tax evasion ratio, T, but will 
increase absolute tax evasion, H, and tax revenues, R. Results are reversed for h < 1, while a 
change in marginal production costs, c, will have no effect for h = 1. 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that under the isoelastic demand function, the existence of a market equilibrium requires 
that n* > 1/h. Otherwise (6) is violated. We suppose this condition to be satisfied throughout.   14 
Proposition 3 shows that the results summarised in Proposition 1 on the relation between 
competition and tax evasion may be reversed if the focus shifts to another deep competition 
parameter.  If  the  demand  function  is  strictly  convex  and  elastic,  a  decline  in  marginal 
production costs will reduce both market power, as measured by the Lerner index, L, and the 
tax evasion ratio, T. Tax revenues, R, will rise. A reduction in marginal production costs can 
then  be  evaluated  positively  since  it  not  only  intensifies  competition,  but  also  generates 
additional governmental revenues and mitigates the problem of tax evasion (at least evasion 
relative to non-evasion revenues). As these effects of a reduction in marginal costs will be 
reversed if demand is inelastic, however, we obtain a further case where a decline in marginal 
production costs not only fosters tax evasion, but also weakens competition. This insight even 
strengthens the result obtained in Proposition 2 as the impact of a fall in marginal production 
costs, c, on tax revenues is unambiguously negative when demand is convex and inelastic. 
As  argued  in  the  introduction,  the  shape  of  the  demand  function  itself  may  be  a  deep 
competition parameter. An increasing openness of economies will make it considerably easier 
for consumers to fall back on foreign products if domestic prices are increased. Consequently, 
the price elasticity of demand may have risen in the last decades due to the introduction of 
regional free trade areas. Furthermore, competition authorities can improve the consumers' 
knowledge concerning substitutes for the good under consideration, thus also raising the price 
elasticity of demand. To determine the impact of a higher elasticity on the market equilibrium 
we again focus on the isoelastic demand function P(X) = X
 –1/h with h > 0, but, for notational 
convenience, define β := – 1/h < 0 so that h increases, if and only if β goes up. To get clear-
cut results, we additionally suppose n*x* ≥  1, implying ln(n*x*) ≥  0, i.e. a sufficiently large 
market.  It  then  follows  P(X) = X
 β,  P'(X) = bX
 β-1,  P''(X) = β(β – 1)X
 β-2,  Aβ = –
 qF''x*β+1n*βln(n*x*) < 0,  Bβ = (1 – τ)x*βn*β-1[1 + (n* + β)ln(n*x*)] > 0  and  Zβ = (1 –
 τ)x*β+1n*βln(n*x*) > 0 from equations (5), (6), and (8). Remember from footnote 10 that the 
existence of an equilibrium requires n* + β > 0. Setting θ = β and using P and its derivatives 
in (13) yields
11 
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11 The sign of (23) can be proven as follows. Let Q(n*) := n* – 1 – (n* + β)ln(n*x*). Differentiating Q(n*), 
taking  into  account  that  dx*/dn* = – x*(n* + β – 1)/[n*(n* + β)]  according  to  (6),  we  obtain  Q'(n*) = (n* –
 1)/n* – ln(n*x*)  and  Q''(n*) = β/[n*(n*+ β)] < 0.  This  implies  Q'(1) < 0.  Since  Q''(n*) < 0  for  all  n* ≥ 1,  it 
follows that Q'(n*) < 0 holds for all n* ≥  1. Similarly, we obtain Q(1) < 0. Q'(n*) < 0 then yields Q(n*) <  0 for 
all n* ≥ 1. Using this insight in (23) implies dn*/dβ > 0.   15 
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Further,  using  Zβ > 0,  Bβ > 0,  as  well  as  0 * n * x ) 1 ( B * x B * n 1
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The intuition underlying equations (23) to (26) is as follows: If demand becomes more elastic, 
producers  will  be  more  constrained  in  their  pricing  behaviour  so  that  aggregate  output 
increases, as indicated by (26). Though this implies that, ceteris paribus, the market price is 
reduced, turnover per firm rises for two reasons: First, taking total output as given, there is a 
(direct)  positive  effect  of  a  higher  price  elasticity  on  the  market  price  P(n*x*) = X
 –1/h. 
Second,  the  increase  in  the  elasticity  enhances  marginal  revenues  (1 – τ)[P + x*P'] = (1 –
 τ)x*(n* – 1/h)(n*x*)
 –(1+h)/h, ceteris paribus. As a consequence, output per firm x* goes up 
according to (25). These two effects more than compensate the price decline due to higher 
aggregate  output.  Hence,  if  demand  becomes  more  elastic,  turnover  per  firm  will  rise  as 
shown in (24). 
The impact of a higher demand elasticity on the degree of competition and tax evasion is as 
follows: Since the number of firms, n*, goes up, absolute tax evasion, H, will increase. In 
contrast,  the  tax  evasion  ratio,  T,  falls  because  turnover  per  firm,  x*P(n*x*),  rises.  The 
increase in H and the decrease in T imply that tax revenues, R, rise. Since (1 – τ)P(n*x*) – c > 
0 from (6) and x*P(n*x*) – α* is constant, the rise in x* must induce a fall in (1 – τ)P(x*n*) –
 c  to  ensure  the  zero-profit  condition  (8).  This  effect  and  the  rise  in  turnover  per  firm, 
x*P(n*x*), together imply a fall in the Lerner-index, L. In sum, we obtain 
Proposition 4: Suppose P(X) = X
 –1/h with h  > 0 and n*x* ≥  1. An increase in the price 
elasticity  of  demand,  h  ,  reduces  the  Lerner-index,  L,  and  the  tax  evasion  ratio,  T,  but 
increases absolute evasion, H, and tax revenues, R. 
The rationale for Proposition 4 is the following. Since the number of firms rises, a higher 
price elasticity of demand reduces market power and thereby intensifies competition. At the 
same  time,  it  raises  turnover  per  firm  implying  that  firms  lower  tax  evasion  relative  to   16 
turnover. Even though absolute tax evasion increases, the reduction in the tax evasion ratio 
induces tax revenues to go up. In summary, the increase in the demand elasticity yields the 
same “double dividend” (more competition, more tax revenues) as the decline in marginal 
production costs when the demand is elastic (see Proposition 3). Put differently, an increase in 
the demand elasticity seems to be the best way to intensify competition as such a policy 
directly reduces tax evasion and, in addition, makes a case less likely in which a decline in 
marginal production costs exerts detrimental effects on competition and tax evasion. 
 
4. Summary and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we developed a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms 
and evasion of indirect taxes. The main question to be investigated was how changes in so-
called deep competition parameters – such as market entry costs, marginal production costs 
and the price elasticity  of demand– affect the degree of competition, tax evasion and tax 
revenues. It turned out that market power and tax evasion may be substitutes from the firms’ 
point of view. For example, a decline in entry costs intensifies competition, but at the same 
time raises tax evasion and may even reduce tax revenues. A similar result will be realised if 
marginal production costs decline and demand is inelastic. In contrast, the desired effects – 
more competition, less tax evasion and more tax revenues – will be obtained by a decline in 
marginal production costs if demand is elastic and by an increase in the demand elasticity. 
To the extent that the deep competition parameters can actually be influenced by public policy 
–  which  we  assumed  throughout  the  analysis  –  our  results  have  mainly  two  policy 
implications. First, opening markets by reducing entry barriers is not always a good choice. 
Many national competition authorities choose this option and try to the intensify competition 
by allowing more firms to enter the market. However, our analysis shows that such a policy 
may have to balance the positive effect on the degree of competition with the potentially 
negative consequences for public funds. It may even be the case that the competition authority 
has to restrict entry to avoid the loss in tax revenues. Second, our analysis suggests that the 
best way to lower the market power of firms is to make demand (more) elastic, for example 
by  reducing  trade  barriers  and  thereby  improving  the  consumers’  opportunities  for  cross-
border shopping. Such a policy not only leads to more competition among firms, but also 
raises tax receipts. Moreover, it makes less likely cases in which tax revenues (and the degree 
of competition) are lowered by a decline in marginal production costs.   17 
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